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We were watching the fire blaze through the North Tower
(Tower 1) of the World Trade Center when we saw the
second jet strike the South Tower (Tower 2). The mood in the
offices of the New York City Police Department (NYPD)
Medical Division was one of disbelief. We realized we were
facing probably the largest multicasualty incident in the city’s
history. Almost immediately, NYPD headquarters issued a
level three (highest) mobilization order and the entire NYPD
was deployed.
The World Trade Center incident was technically an ‘aircraft
crash’, which meant the Fire Department of New York (FDNY)
were to assume command and control. The FDNY Emer-
gency Medical Services (EMS) command assumed responsi-
bility for patient triage, assessments, management, and
transport. The command center was established in the lobby
of the South Tower (Tower 2). Search and rescue became
the primary focus of the response but this could only be
achieved if the disaster was also contained and controlled. All
this required the full deployment of personnel and resources
from both the FDNY and the NYPD.
Initial impressions and demands
Several issues had to be dealt with immediately and simulta-
neously: controlling and containing the fires, dealing with the
possibility of collateral building collapses, mobilizing triage at
numerous locations, stabilizing and mobilizing the anticipated
vast numbers of casualties, and conducting search and
rescue efforts. However, at first, chaos and confusion
reigned. This was initially because communications were
severely hampered by the loss of local telephone services
and the onset of overwhelming cellular phone traffic. But this
initial confusion was minor compared with the huge loss of
personnel and resources as the FDNY command center was
buried when the South Tower (Tower 2) collapsed.
Command and control was further hampered by the physical
characteristics of the area. The World Trade Center site
(17 acres) was effectively divided into two areas (north and
south) by an unstable partially collapsed pedestrian walkway.
The rubble formed ‘mountains’ and ‘valleys’ that were danger-
ous and unstable to walk on. Some of the debris piled three
to four storeys high with 50 foot (16 m) drops between them.
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Abstract
The World Trade Center attack cast some physicians in roles outside their usual hospital practice. The
incident required several physicians to function in the dangerous environment of the disaster. Priorities
and triage strategies established by the police, emergency medical service and fire departments, while
adhered to, required instantaneous modification and upgrading given the vast loss of civilian and
rescue personnel lives. Many civilian medical staff presented themselves with good intentions but
needed to be placed out of the collapse zone for fear of incurring additional casualties. In addition,
problems with re-establishment of command and control, communications, personnel and equipment
replacement all impacted on the rescue effort. This article recounts the roles played by the two co-
authors during the World Trade Center attack.
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Climbing these ‘mountains’ was difficult, especially through
the limited visibility provided by the high concentration of dust
that filled the air. Initial responders developed respiratory diffi-
culties because their respirator masks had inappropriate
filters. Additionally, sections of the rubble were actively
burning below the surface; the subterranean fires were over
1700°F (926°C), creating ground temperatures of 110°F
(43.3°C). Finally, all roads in the immediate area remained
impassable, forcing access to be via circumferential routes.
This lengthened response times and stressed personnel.
Losing personnel and redeployment
The rescue effort was impacted by the overwhelming sense
of loss of first responders. The FDNY Command Center,
which was lost when the South Tower collapsed, included
‘special operation command units’. These specialty rescue
units were primarily responsible for pivotal tasks, such as
building assessments, triage, and rescues within confined
spaces. All these skills were critically lacking due to a loss of
approximately 70% of the personnel. It is impossible to
understate the psychological impact of trying to conduct
such a massive search and rescue task when so many friends
and comrades have been lost.
The lost personnel and command centers had to be replaced.
The NYPD Special Operations Division/Emergency Services
Unit moved to the evacuated Styvestant High School, situated
close to the World Trade Center site. Staging areas were set
up out of harm’s way and, from here, all medical response
units were designated to a specified area. From these distant
sites, medical response units were also able to identify and
communicate the resources available and needed.
Securing peripheral areas
While some rescue teams worked in the collapse zone to
gather the injured and dead, others were deployed to sur-
rounding buildings to conduct search and rescue operations.
This was not only to seek out other victims in collateral struc-
tures, but also to enhance the perimeter security in two ways.
First, several of these buildings appeared in danger of col-
lapse. Second, there was concern that these buildings could
be used by terrorists to launch a subsequent attack or to
deploy a secondary device (conventional or biochemical) with
the specific aim of harming the rescue effort. Consider for a
moment the issues and concerns you would have with provid-
ing medical backup to a police tactical unit engaged in such
an operation. Will the encounter with a ‘victim’ in one of these
buildings require medical intervention or police action?
Furthermore, the risk of concomitant biochemical attack is
indeed real and, while beyond the scope of this paper, never-
theless looms heavily.
Controlling ‘freelance’ medical care
With the arrival of reinforcements came the unprepared ‘free-
lancers’ who, while meaning well, began their own versions of
search and rescue and medical care. It was quite worrying to
see physicians dressed only in scrubs, clogs, and surgical
masks attempting to negotiate the jagged metal debris to
carry out their well-meaning medical interventions. In some
instances, these interventions were in direct conflict with
established protocols of the FDNY EMS for dealing with
victims of such an incident. Needless to say, these physicians
received an immediate lesson in command and control from
one of the authors.
Part of the established FDNY EMS protocol authorizes only
physicians from the FDNY EMS Office of Medical Affairs to
conduct medical care in and around a designated collapse/
disaster zone. In this area, medical control was assumed by
an FDNY EMS physician (DG). Specialty units, like the NYPD
Special Operations Division, had a physician assigned to
their search and rescue team (CM). Both physicians con-
sulted throughout the initial phases of the rescue effort to
address issues of patient triage, and the dangers and health
risks to rescue personnel. Triage stations were established
throughout the perimeter of the incident area and the ‘free-
lancing’ civilian medical personnel were relegated to these
stations.
The major concern is of potential injury or death to a novice
rescuer. At the Oklahoma City bombing, a nurse was killed by
falling debris. Many well-meaning medical staff are unaware
of the potential dangers associated with collapse zone
medical operations. Many were attempting to render patient
care using ‘ordinary’ approaches in an area that demanded
the extraordinary.
Conclusion
The attack on the World Trade Center realized some of the
gravest concerns that many in the medical profession prefer
not to entertain. The catastrophic losses from the attack were
a continued cascade of worse case scenarios. Although the
resources brought to bear on this disaster taxed multiple
agencies to their limits, after the first 24 hours no living
victims were recovered. This led to enormous frustration and
anguish among the rescue personnel whose efforts were
thwarted by destruction, fire, and the seemingly immovable
wreckage. The police and fire personnel sought painfully and
hard for their colleagues, as well as for civilians.
There are many lessons to be learnt from the initial response
to the World Trade Center attack. While the incident was
dramatic, these lessons are the same as those from pervious
disasters, such as the earthquakes in Tanging, Kobe, Taiwan,
Turkey and Armenia. First, the majority of survivors are self-
rescued. Second, delays in organized rescue are not uncom-
mon and should be an expected component of the process.
While this delay should be as short as possible, it should also
be recognized that time is needed to organize rescue efforts
in such a way that survivors are accessed and treated within
the limits of available resources. Third, successful rescue
depends on simultaneous search, rescue, and medicalCritical Care    December 2001 Vol 5 No 6 Martinez and Gonzalez
support, with patient management primarily focusing on rapid
transport to appropriate facilities, such as trauma centers, for
definitive care.
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